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Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.:
One Step Closer to Exterminating the
FIFRA Preemption Controversy
INTRODUCTION
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution' declares
that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
any Thing m the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this
clause to mean that any state law that conflicts with federal law is
"without effect" and is, therefore, preempted by the federal law.3 Thus
began the battle between the states and the federal government to
determine which will ultimately control when both attempt to regulate the
same area.4 This battle continues to this day m several areas.5
'U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
aId.
'Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that, due to the Supremacy Clause, any state law that conflicts
with federal law is preempted by federal law).
' For an excellent discussion of the doctrine ofpreemption in general and particularly as applied
to the analysis of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, see Mary Lee A. Howarth,
Preemption and Punitive Damages: The Conflict Continues Under FIFRA, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1301,
1309-17 (1988).
For other articles discussing federal preemption under FIFRA, see the following: Kevin McElroy
et al., The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act: Preemption and Toxic Tort Law, 2
FORDHAM ENvrL. L. REi. 29 (1990); Joseph T. Carter, Note, Papas v. Upjohn Co.-The Possibility
That FIFRA Might Preempt State Common-Law Tort Claims Should Be Extenminated, 45 ARK. L.
REV. 729 (1992); James F. Homer, Jr., Comment, Constitutional Law-Papas v. Upjohn- Federal
Preemption of State Common Law Tort Claims Based on Inadequate Labeling Under FIFRA, 22
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 621 (1992); Timothy J Kuester, Comment, FIFRA as an Affirmative Defense:
Pre-emption of Common-Law Tort Clauns of Inadequate Labeling, 40 KAN. L. REV. 1119 (1992);
Timothy A. Quarberg, Note, Getting the Bugs Out: The Rule of Legzslative History in Determining
the Pre-Emptive Effect ofFIFRA Upon Local Regulation ofPesticides in Wisconsin Public Intervenor
v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991), 15 HAmLNE L. REv. 223 (1991); RuthAnn Sherman, Comment,
Chemical Warfare Agent Research Regulation: The Conflict Between Federal and Local Control, 14
B.C. ENvrL An'. L. REv. 131 (1986); Norman E. Siegel, Note, FIFRA and Preemption: Can &ate
Common Law and Federal Regulations Coexist?, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNrrmnp. L. 257 (1992);
Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context: A Unified Method of Analysis, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 197 (1978).
' Se eg., Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thomburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986) (public utilities);
Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986) (labor relations).
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The question of whether section 136v(b)6 of the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act7 ("FIFRA") preempts state tort
law damage claims based on failure to warn is one that has perplexed
federal courts for several years. Since the controversy began, federal
court decisions have fallen into one of two camps: FIFRA either
expressly or impliedly preempts state tort law damage actions based
on failure to warn,' or there is no such preemption.9 While the
Supreme Court has ruled on the issue of federal preemption of state
regulation of pesticide use,"0 it has never directly addressed the issue
of state regulation of pesticide labeling and packaging."
' Section 136v states in relevant part as follows:
§ 136v. Authority of States
(a) In general
A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or device in
the State, but only if and to the extent the regulation does not pennit any sale or use
prohibited by this subchapter.
(b) Uniformity
Such State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or
packaging in addition to or different from those required under tins subchapter.
7 U.S.C. § 136v(a)-(b) (1988).
' 7 U.S.C. § 136a-y (1988 & Supp. II 1990) [hereinafter FIFRA].
'See Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Young v. American
Cyananid Co., 786 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Ark. 1991); Herr v. Carolina Log Bldgs., Inc., 771 F. Supp.
958 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Fisher v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F.
Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987); see also infra notes 76-94 and accompanying text (discussing
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), vacated
and remanded sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co, 113 S. Ct. 314
(1992), a ffdsub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d
1177 (10th Cir. 1993)).
' See Thornton v. Fondren Green Apartments, 788 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Riden v. ICI
Ares., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F.
Supp. 1345 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Stewart v. Ortho Consumer Prods., No. CIV.A.87.4252, 1990 WL
36129 (E.D. La. Mar. 26, 1990); Cox v. Velsicol Chew. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1989);
Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195 (N.D. Il1. 1988); Wilson v. Chevron Chem. Co., No.
CIV.A.83.762, 1986 WL 14925 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986); see also infra notes 45-75 and
accompanying text (discussing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984)).
" See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, II S. Ct. 2476, 2487 (1991) (holding that FIFRA
did not preempt state or local pesticide use regulation, but not specifically addressing the narrower
issue of pesticide labeling preemption).
" Regarding the current status of the labeling and packaging issue in federal distnct and
appellate courts, one court noted that "[t]he great split in authority is important to illustrate that even
when the consequences of state action clearly pressure companies to change their FIFRA labels,
there is no consensus on whether the state action is preempted." Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n
v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 948 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 80 (1992).
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In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court faced
the issue of federal preemption m the context of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act," which was later amended and
replaced by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 14 The
Court held that certain of the petitioner's state tort law damage
claims-particularly the failure-to-warn claim-were expressly
preempted by these Acts, while others survived. 5 As to the applica-
tion of Cipollone to other federal statutes, hbwever, this case clearly
"raises more questions than it answers"' 6 and does little to aid lower
courts in determining whether section 136v(b) of FIFRA preempts
state tort law damage claims based on failure to warn due to
inadequate labeling. 7
Part 1Is of this Note sets forth the state of FIFRA preemption law
prior to Cipollone by summarizing the leading cases of Ferebee v.
Chevron Chemical Co. 9 and Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v.
Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. ("Arkansas-Platte I")." Part 1121 ad-
dresses the Cipollone opinion itself in detail, and Part III applies
the analysis undertaken in that case to the FIFRA preemption analysis.
This Note concludes that, in light of Cipollone,23 FIFRA expressly
preempts all state tort law damage claims based on failure to warn if
the label has been approved by the EPA. This conclusion is based on
n 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1965), amended by Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1969).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1969) (amending Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1965)).
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2625.
"Id. at 2638 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
, However, the Court has directed that this specific issue be decided by remanding Papas v.
Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), and Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co.,
113 S. Ct. 314 (1992), both FIFRA preemption cases, to be reconsidered in light of Cipollone, a
cigarette labeling case. See znfta notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
"See mfra notes 26-110 and accompanying text.
,736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.) [hereinafter Arkansas-Platte 1], vacated and remanded sub nom.
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992), arffd sub nom.,
Arkansas.Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993).
This case was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court to be redecided in light of the Cipollone
decision. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Che. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992). The Tenth
Circuit reaffirmed its prior finding of preemption, but based this subsequent decision on an express
preemption analysis. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d
1177 (10th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Arkansas-Platte 111. See infra notes 185 and 199 for a discussion
of the Arkansas-Platte II decision.
2 See mfra notes 111-62 and accompanying text.
See mfra notes 163-208 and accompanying text.
" 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
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the application of the Supreme Court's holdings in Cipollone that if
a federal statute contains an express preemption provision, then the
analysis should be one of express preemption,24 and that a state
damages action is the functional equivalent of direct state regula-
tion . 5
I. PREEMPTION OF FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIMS
UNDER FIFRA PRIOR TO CIPOLLONE
A. The Preemption Doctnne
The doctrine of preemption has evolved from the Supremacy
Clause,26 which gives Congress the power to enact legislation that
supersedes state or local laws.2 ' The sweep of federal preemption is not
limited to conflicting state legislative or regulatory law, but extends m
some situations to state common law doctrnes. 28
In deciding whether a federal statute preempts state law, the intent of
Congress is the "ultimate touchstone,"29 and this intent may be either
"explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained m its
structure and purpose."3 Preemption can be inferred m a number of
ways:
(1) "when there is outnght or actual conflict between federal and
state law;"
(2) "where compliance with both federal and state law is in effect
physically impossible;"
(3) "where there is implicit in federal law a bamer to state
regulation;"
(4) "where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupy-
ing an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to
supplement federal law;" or
4 Id. at 2618, 2633 (Scalia, J., concurrng in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2620. In short, this author rejects the reasoning promulgated in Ferebee (introducing the
"choice of reaction" theory) as being flawed. See infra notes 45-75 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Ferebee decision.
U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1988) (holding that afederal
statute preempted local regulation of the issuance of securities by a pipeline orgamzation).
" See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987) ("It would be
extraordinary for Congress, after devising an elaborate . system that sets clear standards, to tolerate
common-law suits that have the potential to undermine the regulatory structure.").
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhom, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
[Vol. 81
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(5) "where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full objectives of Congress."3'
Implied preemption also occurs when a state law stands "as an obstacle
to the full implementation of a federal law 1232
B. FIFRA
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act was enacted
in 194733 to replace The Insecticide Act of 1910,' which was Congress'
first pesticide regulation statute. FIFRA was "primarily a licensing and
labeling statute '3 until its 1972 revision,36  which "transformed FIFRA
from a labeling law into a comprehensive regulatory statute."37
Under FIFRA, the EPA has the power to regulate the use, sale, and
labeling of pesticldes,s as well as their registration.39 In order to
register a pesticide, the manufacturer must submit "enormous quantities
of techrcal data'"4 regarding the effects of the pesticide on humans and
the environment and have its plan approved by the EPA.4' FIFRA
controls almost every aspect of pesticide labeling through this registration
process.42
" Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1021 (lith Cir. 1991) (quoting Louisiana Public Service
Comm'n v. Federal Commumcations Conm'n, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69 (1986)) (citations omitted),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), aff'dsub nom.,
Papas v. Upjohn Co., No. 89-3752, 1993 WL 41169 (11th Cir. Mar. 8, 1993)).
1Id.
61 Stat. 163 (1947) (onginally enacted as The Insecticide Act of 1910, ch. 191, § 13, 31 Stat.
335 (191o)).
' 36 Stat. 331 (1910), repealed by Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, ch. 125,
§ 16, 61 Stat. 172 (1947), 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988 & Supp. 111990).
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1984).
"86 Stat. 975 (1972) (amending Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, ch. 125,
§ 16, 61 Stat. 172 (1947)).
,Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991.
"7 U.S.C. § 136v(a)-(b) (1988).
"Id. § 136a(a), (c).
, FREDERICK R. ANDERSON Er Al., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECHON LAW AND PoLIcY 540
(19B4).
4 7 U.S.C. § 136a(cX2) (1988 & Supp. 111990) (requing specific data be approved); see also
id. § 136a(a), (cX5) (1988) (requing that the plan be approved by the EPA).
A manufacturer must submit a copy of the label to the EPA for approval. 7 U.S.C. §
136a(cX1XC) (1988). The EPA has developed extensive regulation governing pesticide labeling,
including the regulation of label contents, 40 C.F.R. § 156.10(a)(1)(i)-(ix) (1992), the label's
prormnence and legibility, id. § 156.10(aX2), a requirement that the label appear on a clear and
contrasting background, id. § 156.10(a)(2Xii)(B), regulation of the language, id. § 156.10(a)(3),
placement, id. § 156.10(aX4), use of certain hazard "signal words," id. § 156.10(h)(1)(i)(A)-(E), and
a statement regarding first aid treatment, id. § 156.10(h)(1)(iii)(B). For other labeling requirements,
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If a manufacturer of pesticides does not comply with FIFRA
regulations, the United States Attorney General may institute criminal
and/or civil proceedings against the manufacturer.43 FIFRA also
authorizes the EPA to assess civil penalties of up to $5000 per
offense."
C. The Ferebee v Chevron Chemical Co. Rationale
The first federal court of appeals to address the issue of whether
FIFRA preempts state tort law damage claims based on failure to
warn was the D.C. Circuit in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.45
This case has since become the leading case for the argument that
FIFRA does not expressly or impliedly preempt state tort law damage
claims based on failure to warn, regardless of the fact that the label
in question complies with all other FIFRA labeling requirements.'
The plaintiff in Ferebee had been exposed several times to the
pesticide paraquat while applying it to greenhouse plants and fields
during the course of his job as an agricultural worker.47 As a result,
Mr. Ferebee suffered from pulmonary fibrosis and eventually died
from this condition." His estate argued that the pesticide manufactur-
er, Chevron, had failed in its duty to warn Mr. Ferebee, via the label,
of the dangers of long-term exposure to paraquat.49
Chevron first argued that it could not be held liable for failure to
warn because the labels affixed to its paraquat containers had been
approved by the EPA and complied with FIFRA labeling require-
ments.50 Rejecting this argument, the court held that compliance with
FIFRA's labeling scheme does not automatically shield manufacturers
see generally 40 C.F.R. Part 156.
7 U.S.C. § 136g(c)(1) (1988).
Id. § 1361(a)(1) (1988).
"736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. demed, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
"See Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (D. Mont.
1991); Riden v. ICI Ares., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Evenson v. Osmose
Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Stewart v. Ortho Consumer Prods.,
No. CIV.A.87.4252, 1990 WL 36129, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 26, 1990); Cox v. Velmcol Chen. Corp.,
704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 197 (N.D. Ill.
1988).
" Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1532.
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from liability for state tort law damage claims. 51 The court stated that
"[t]he fact that EPA has determined that Chevron's label is adequate
for purposes of FIFRA does not compel a jury to find that the label
is also adequate for purposes of state tort law as well."'52 The court
stated that the purposes of state tort law were very distinct from those
of FIFRA, noting that state tort law "may have broader compensatory
goals [and, therefore,] a label may be inadequate under state law
if that label fails to warn against any significant risk."5
Chevron then argued that FIFRA preempted the states from even
considering such questions because state tort law damage actions were
completely preempted by FIFRA, based on section 136v(b)" of the
Act.55 At the heart of Chevron's argument was the contention that
such actions have a regulatory effect on manufacturers and, therefore,
are barred by the plain language of the statute.56 Again, the court
rejected Chevron's argument. In support of its holding, the court noted
that, while a damage award would certainly encourage a manufacturer
to alter its labeling in order to avoid future lawsuits, it would in no
way require a manufacturer to do so.57 In explaining this distinction,
the court stated:
The verdict itself does not command Chevron to alter its label-the
verdict merely tells Chevron that, if it chooses to continue selling
paraquat in Maryland, it may have to compensate for some of the
resulting injuries. That may in some sense impose a burden on the
sale of paraquat in Maryland, but it is not equivalent to a direct
regulatory command that Chevron change its label. Chevron can
comply with both federal and state law by continuing to use the
EPA-approved label and by simultaneously paying damages to
successful tort plaintiffs such as Mr. Ferebee."
11 Id. at 1540.
sId.
"Id. The court further stated that
a state jury may find a product inadequately labeled despite the EPA's deteriunation that,
for purposes of FIFRA, the label is adequate. The EPA's determination may be taken into
account by the jury, and the jury was instructed in this case that it was permitted to do
so, but absent preemption the jury need not give that determination conclusive weight.
Id.
7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988). See supra note 6 (reproducing the statute in part).
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This concept has become known as the "choice of reaction" theory,59
as manufacturers may simply choose how to react to a damages judg-
ment."
The Ferebee court next discussed the general preemption analysis
that courts must undertake m determining whether FIFRA preempts
state tort law A court must "start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by
Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."61 However, if this purpose is found to exist either expressly
or impliedly, then the state law must yield to the will of Congress.
According to the Ferebee court, Congress may manifest this purpose m
" In a pre-Cipollone cigarette labeling case, the First Circuit had this to say about the reasoning
in Ferebee:
The [plaintiffs] disingenuously maintain that any monetary damages awarded would not
compel a manufacturer to change its label for, after all, "the choice of how to react is left
to the manufacturer." This "choice of reaction" seems akin to the free choice of coming
up for air after being underwater. Once a jury has found a label inadequate under state
law, and the manufacturer liable for damages for negligently employing it, it is
unthinkable that any manufacturer would not immediately take steps to rmmmze its
exposure to continued liability. The most obvious change it can take, of course, is to
change its label. Effecting such a change in the manufacturer's behavior and imposing
such additional warning requirements is the very action preempted by § 1334 of the
[cigarette labeling] Act. Indeed, it arrogates to a single jury the regulatory power explicitly
denied to all fifty states' legislative bodies.
Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627-28 (ist Cir. 1987).
" Several jurisdictions follow this "choice of reaction" analysis. See Montana Pole & Treating
Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (D. Mont. 1991); Riden v. ICI Ams., Inc., 763
F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
1345, 1348 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Stewart v. Ortho Consumer Prods., No. CIV.A.87.4252, 1990 WL
36129, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 26, 1990); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa.
1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 197 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
But see International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), wherein the Supreme Court
stated the following regarding the effect of the Clean Water Act on state tort law damage actions:
If the Vermont court ruled that respondents were entitled to the full amount of damages
and injunctive relief sought in the complaint, at a mimmum [the defendant] would have
to change its methods of doing business and controlling pollution to avoid the threat of
ongoing liability. Critically, these liabilities would attach even though the [defendant]
had complied fully with its state and federal obligations. The inevitable result of such
suits would be that Vermont and other States could do indirectly what they could not do
directly-regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources [of water pollution].
Id. at 495. The New York Supreme Court considered the possible effect of Ouellette on Ferebee in
Little v. Dow Chem. Co., 559 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1990). In finding that FIFRA preempted the
plaintiff's failure to warn claims, the court stated that "the Supreme Court's recent decision in
[Ouellette] undercuts Ferebee's precedential value." Id. at 791. See also San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ('The obligation to pay compensation [through an
award of damages] can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and
controlling policy.').
" Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1542 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
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one of three ways: 1) Congress may explicitly or expressly preempt state
action;62 2) compliance with both the federal and state law may be
impossible;63 or 3) the state law may "stand[ ] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.""
The court concluded that none of these principles stood as a bar
to a state tort law damage action such as the one at issue.65 First of
all, "Congress has not explicitly preempted state damage actions; it
has merely precluded states from directly ordering changes in the
EPA-approved labels."" In fact, several courts have acknowledged that
compliance with a federal regulatory scheme does not m and of itself
preclude a jury from finding that a label was inadequate.' Second, the
court observed that it was not impossible for Chevron to comply with
both the federal and state law m this case. As discussed above, Chevron
has a "choice" of how to react: it may either "continue to use the EPA-
approved label and pay damages to successful tort plaintiffs"'  or
"petition the EPA to allow the label to be made more comprehensive."69
Finally, the court stated that a damage claim did not stand as an obstacle
to accomplishing the goals of FIFRA as evidenced in FIFRA's legislative
history, which indicates an intent to allow the states broad regulatory
powers in the area of pesticide use."0 Therefore, the court held, FIFRA
,See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
"Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Commumcations Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69
(1986); see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
It should be noted that the Ferebee court failed to address one additional way in which
Congress may evidence its intent to supplant state authority: "occupation of the field." See Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that federal preemption exists if a
scheme of federal regulation is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement [federal law], "). Regarding preemption doctrines in general,
see Howarth, supra note 4, at 1309-17.
Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1542.
"Id.
"Id.; see also, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 661 (Cal. 1973) (Food and
Drug Adrmistration requirements); Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1986 (D.C. 1976)
(requirements under Federal Hazardous Substances Act); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 41 A.2d
850, 853 (Pa. 1945) (Surgeon General-approved label). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 288c (1965) ("Compliance with a legislative enactment or an adrmstrative regulation does
not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.").
Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1542.
"Id.
,Id. at 1542-43. It is odd that the Ferebee court reaches this conclusion before undertaking a
full and complete analysis of the entire legislative history of the FIFRA preemption provision.
Perhaps this is due to a desre to avoid the following language in H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 16 (1971): "In dividing the responsibility between the States and the Federal Government for
the management of an effective pesticide program, the Committee had adopted language which is
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does not expressly or impliedly preempt state tort law damage claims
based on failure to warn.7
The Ferebee court's reliance on policy arguments is conspicuous. For
instance, the court stated that "[e]ven if Chevron could not alter the label,
Maryland could decide that, as between a manufacturer and an injured
party, the manufacturer ought to bear the cost of compensating for those
mjunes that could have been prevented with a more detailed label than
that approved by the EPA."'72 Later in the opinion, the court pointed out
that "a state tort action of the kind under review may aid in the exposure
of new dangers associated with pesticides."'73 Manufacturers burdened
with damage judgments could petition the EPA to allow more detailed
labeling requirements in light of the new information in the civil action,
or the EPA could revise labeling requirements on its own initiative. 74
Finally, the court noted that the fact "[tlhat Maryland cannot directly
order a change in the way in winch paraquat is labelled does not
deprive the state of legitimate aims wich it is entitled to further through
the imposition of traditional tort liability."'75 It thus appears that the
Ferebee court was more interested in furthering these "legitimate aims"
than in relying upon a traditional preemption analysis.
D. The Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers,
Inc. Rationale
At the other end of the preemption spectrum from Ferebee lies
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc.
("Arkansas-Platte I").76 In this case, the plaintiff, Arkansas-Platte,
succeeded to ownership of property previously owned by a wooden
fence-post treatment facility, winch used the chemical "Dowicide 7" to
intended to completely preempt State authority in regard to labeling and packaging."
Additional legislative history of congressional intent regarding the role of the states under
FIFRA can be found in S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 4021, and S. REP. No. 970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972), repnnted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4092, 4111-12.
7" Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1542.




' 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.) [hereinafter Arkansas-Platte 1], vacated and remanded sub nom.
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992), afd sub nom.
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993).
The Tenth Circuit recently heard Arkansas-Platte I on remand from the Supreme Court. Arkansas-
Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 [hereinafter Arkansas-Platte
fl]. See infra notes 185, 199 for a discussion of this decision.
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treat the posts.' When one of Arkansas-Platte's employees contracted
pentachlorophenol poisoning, Arkansas-Platte sued Van Waters & Rogers
and Dow Chemical, the manufacturer and distributor of the product,
clainmg negligence and strict liability based on failure to warn." The
district court held that neither of the state tort law claims was expressly
or impliedly preempted by FIFRA and denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.79 The Tenth Circuit then took this issue on interloc-
utory appeal, reversing the denial of summary judgment and holding that
FIFRA mipliedly preempted the plaintiff's state tort law damage clamis
alleging improper labeling and failure to warn."
According to the court, implied preemption has two bases: "the direct
conflict posed with federal uniform regulation of pesticides, and
[Congress' intent] to occupy the field of pesticide labeling regulation."'"
The Arkansas-Platte I court agreed with the reasoning employed by the
Eleventh Circuit m Papas v. Upjohn Co." At that time, the Eleventh
Circuit was the only federal court of appeals that had considered the
issue, and it had found preemption. 3 According to the Arkansas-Platte
I court:
While FIFRA explicitly instructs [that] states can regulate the sale or
use of federally registered pesticides, § 136v(b) precludes "any
requirements for labeling orpackaging in addition to or different from
those required pursuant to this act." The Papas court reasoned jury
awards of damages m these actions would result in direct conflict with
federal law. We agree.'
Thus, the court made a distinction between the regulation of pesticide use
and the regulation of pesticide labeling and packaging, a distirction the
7 Arkansas-Platte I, 959 F.2d at 158.
"Id. at 159.
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1474, 1482,
1484 (D. Colo. 1990).
Arkansas-Platte 1, 959 F.2d at 159. The court did not undertake an express preemption
analysis anywhere in the opinion: "We need not reach the district court's holding there is no express
FIFRA preemption, and emphasize our holding only concerns the narrow issue of labeling." Id. at
164. Contra Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Kennan v. Dow Chem.
Co., 717 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D.
Mich. 1987).
"AArkansas-Platte 1, 959 F.2d at 164.
"926 F.2d 1019 (1lth Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded sub noma. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112
S. Ct. 3020 (1992), aff'd sub nom. Papas v. Upjohn Co., No. 89-3752, 1993 WL 41169 (lith Cir.
Mar. 8, 1993).
Arkansas-Platte I, 959 F.2d at 161.
Id. (quoting Papas, 926 F.2d at 1024).
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Ferebee court smply did not address."5 The court concluded that while
Congress had not occupied the broad field of pesticide regulation, it had
occupied the narrower field of pesticide labeling and packaging.
The Arkansas-Platte I court amved at this distinction by relying
heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin Public Intervenor
v. Mortier ' The court noted that in Mortier, "the Supreme Court
reasoned Congress had not occupied the entire field of pesticide
regulation [but] Congress had impliedly preempted state regulation
in the more narrow area of labeling."'r Concluding that allowing
damage claims against the manufacturer would result in a direct conflict
with the federal mandate in section 136v(b),"9 the court determined that
no state may require anything in addition to or different from a label
approved under FIFRA. The court maintained that "[s]tate court damage
awards based on failure to warn would constitute ad hoc determinations
of the adequacy of statutory labeling standards [by individual states'
juries]. This would hinder the accomplishment of the full purpose of
§ 136v(b), which is to ensure uniform labeling standards."9
The "choice of reaction" theory9' was not accepted by the Arkansas-
Platte I court, which stated that "[a] business choice between paying
damages and changing the label is only notional. This choice cannot
be consistent with FIFRA's preclusion of 'any requirements for labeling
or packaging in addition to or different from' the statutory mandate."'
See supra notes 45-75 and accompanying text.
Arkansas-Platte 1, 959 F.2d at 160 ("A plain reading of the statute indicates a more
specific intent to occupy the field in labeling and packaging, § 136v(b)"); see also Davidson v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 936 & n.7 (Nev. 1992) (holding that Congress intended to
occupy the field of pesticide labeling and, therefore, failure-to-warn claims were impliedly preempted
by FIFRA).
' 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991); see infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text (discussing the Mortier
decision).
u Arkansas-Platte I, 959 F.2d at 163 (citing Morlier, 111 S. Ct. at 2479); see also id. at 163
nn.5-6 (emphasizing the use/labeling distinction and further stating that "Montana Pole wrongly relies
on Mortier without considering the Court's distinction between preemption of state regulation of the
sale and use of pesticides, and state authority over labeling").
"7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988); see supra note 6 (reproducing the statute in part).
"Arkansas-Platte 1, 959 F.2d at 162 (emphasis added). "The 1972 provisions sought to 'regulate
the use of pesticides to protect man and his environment,' and 'extend Federal pesticide regulations
to actions entirely within a single State.' Id. at 160 (quoting Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F.
Supp. 799, 804 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (citing S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972), repnnted
an 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993, 3993)).
The Ferebee court seemed to ignore the "label uniformity" purpose of FIFRA in its implied
preemption analysis. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
"See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
9 Arkansas-Platte , 959 F.2d at 162-63 (quoting The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988)).
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The court further rejected the Ferebee court's conclusion as to the
legislative history of FIFRA, stating that the history "is not clear on the
question of state common law tort actions based on labeling and failure
to wam[,]" '93 contrary to the Ferebee court's findings. 4
E. A Word on Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier
While the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue
faced m either Ferebee or Arkansas-Platte I, s it has broached the
subject of preemption of state regulation of pesticides under FIFRA in
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier 6 In this case, a property owner
applied for a permit pursuant to a town ordinance in order to aerially
spray pesticides on part of his property.97 The town issued the permit to
Mortier, but with strict limitations." Mortier then sued for a declaratory
judgment, claiming that FIFRA preempted the ordinance." The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of Mortier and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court affirmed."°°
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that
FIFRA did not preempt local regulation of pesticide use, either express-
ly 0' or impliedly. °2 There was no "occupation of the field" of pesti-
"Id. at 163.
9' Several jurisdictions have chosen to follow the rationale set forth in Arkansas-Platte I over
the "choice of reaction" theory promulgated in Ferebee. See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019
(11th Cir. 1991) (finding implied preemption), vacated and remanded sub nom. Papas v. Zoecon
Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), aff'dsub nom. Papas v. Upjohn Co., No. 89-3752, 1993 WL 41169
(11th Cir. Mar. 8, 1993); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987) (cigarette
labeling case); Young v. American Cyanamid Co., 786 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (finding
preemption of the field of pesticide labeling); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799 (M.D.
Fla. 1989) (finding express preemption); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1283 (W.D. Mo.
1989) (finding implied preetion); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich.
1987) (finding preemption); Begley v. Truly Nolan Extermnating, Inc., 573 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. App.
1991) (finding preemption); Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. App. 1992) (finding
implied preemption); Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931 (Nev. 1992) (finding
preemption).
"The narrower issue in these cases was whether FIFRA preempted the states' power to regulate
pesticide labeling as opposed to pesticide use. See Arkansas-Platte I, 959 F.2d at 163; Ferebee, 736
F.2d at 540.




Mortier v. Casey, 452 N.W.2d 555 (Wis. 1990).
"'TIFRA nowhere expressly supersedes local regulation of pesticide use." Motier, 111 S. Ct.
at 2482.
"0 "Likewise, FIFRA fails to provide any clear and manifest indication that Congress sought to
supplant local authority over pesticide regulation impliedly." Id. at 2485.
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cide regulation by FIFRA, as it "leaves substantial portions of the field
vacant[ ] ,,103 The Court further stated that FIFRA "does not
occupy the field of pesticide regulation in general or the area of local use
permitting in particular."'" Additionally, the Court found that there was
no conflict between FIFRA and the ordinance at issue m Morier On the
contrary, "FIFRA implies a regulatory partnerslup between federal, state,
and local governments."' 5 It is therefore clear under Mortier that
FIFRA leaves to the states the power to regulate the sale and use of
pesticides.
However, the Supreme Court's position on whether FIFRA has
preempted the field of pesticide labeling is much less clear. As noted in
Arkansas-Platte I,"'1 certain statements made by the Court in dicta
indicate that it might possibly hold the field of pesticide labeling
preempted by FIFRA if it were to decide this specific issue in the future.
For example, the Court noted the following regarding section 136v(b):
[The language of § 136v(b)] would be pure surplusage if Congress had
intended to occupy the entire field of pesticide regulation. Taking such
pre-emption as the premise, § 136v(a) would thus grant States the
authority to regulate the "sale or use" of pesticides, while § 136v(b)
would superfluously add that States did not have the authority to
regulate "labeling or packaging," an addition that would have been
doubly superfluous given FIFRA's histonc focus on labeling to begin
with."17
This language provides strong support for the position that regulation
of the labeling of pesticides does not necessarily fall under the scope
of the regulation of pesticide sale or use.
Even more telling is a later statement made by the Court: "As we
have also made plain, local use permit regulations-unlike labeling or
certification-do not fall within an area that FIFRA's 'program' pre-
empts or even plainly addresses."'0' This necessarily implies that the
" Id. at 2486. See also Worm v. Amencan Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1305 (4th Cir. 1992)
(finding no occupation of the entire field of pesticide regulation).
Moter, 111 S. Ct. at 2486 (emphasis added).
0 Id. at 2487.
.Arkansas-Platte 1, 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom. Arkansas-Platte
& Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992), aff'dsub nora. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf
Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993); see supra notes 76-94
and accompanying text.
007 Morrier, 111 S. Ct. at 2486 (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991 (1984)).
I d. at 2487 (emphasis added).
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fields of labeling and certification do fall within an area that FIFRA
preempts and, therefore, states may not regulate in these areas.' 9 At
the same time, this language forces a distinction between the
regulation of pesticide sale or use and the regulation of pesticide
labeling, a distinction relied upon by many courts and ignored by
others.
In conclusion, Mortier is not dispositive on the issue of preemp-
tion of state tort law damage claims based on the inadequate labeling
of pesticides. This is an area that the Supreme Court or Congress
must eventually address directly "'
II. CIPOLLONE V LTGGETT GRoup, INC.
A. Background and Procedural History
The Supreme Court recently spoke on the issue of federal
preemption of state tort law damage actions in the context of cigarette
labeling in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc."' The petitioner in
Cipllone was the son of Rose Cipollone, who originated the action
in federal court"2 against a group of cigarette manufacturers and
marketers. Mrs. Cipollone and her husband died during the course of
the litigation, and their son maintained the action on behalf of their
estates.' He alleged that the respondents were responsible for his
mother's development of lung cancer and, ultimately, her death, based
on the following claims: failure to warn,"4 design defect, breach of
express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to
defraud."'
The respondents contended, inter alia, that section 5 of the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act"6 and section 5(b) of the
"I See Arkansas-Platte I, 959 F.2d at 163; Young v. American Cyanamd Co., 786 F. Supp. 781,
783 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
lO See supra note 17; mfra note 185.
" 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
.' Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.NJ. 1984).
' Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2614.
"he 'failure to warn claims' allege both that the product was 'defective as a result of
[respondents'] failure to provide adequate warnings of the health consequences of cigarette smolang'
and that respondents 'werenegligent in the manner [that] they tested, researched, sold, promoted, and
advertised' their cigarettes." Id. (citations omitted).
1 Id.
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Act], amended by the Public Health Cigarette
Smolang Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1969). The preemption provision reads in relevant part
as follows:
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Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 196917 preempted all state tort
law damage claims "based on [the respondents'] conduct after 1965."".
Mrs. Cipollone began smoking cigarettes prior to the enactment of either
provision." 9
The New Jersey District Court held that neither Act preempted state
court common law actions and granted the petitioner's motion to strike
the preemption defense.2 However, in an interlocutory appeal, the
Third Circuit reversed this ruling and held that the preemption provisions
did m fact preempt the petitioner's common law failure-to-warn
claims.' In so ruling, the court rejected the respondents' contention that
the provisions expressly preempted common law actions, but accepted
their contention that they impliedly did so." Upon remand to the
district court, the petitioner's failure-to-warn claim was ruled preempted
by the decision of the court of appeals." However, when the case was
presented to the jury, "[t]he jury found that Liggett, prior to 1966, had
failed to warn customers of health risks of smoking and that this failure
to warn proximately caused Mrs. Cipollone's lung cancer and death."'24
The Third Circuit affirmed the ruling on the issues relevant to this
discussion," and the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiora-
ri"'26 "to consider the preemptive effect of the federal statutes."'2 7
§ 5 Preemption
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this Act.
Id. § 1334.
i 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Act] (amending the Federal Cigarette and
Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1965)). Section 5(b) of this Act reads as follows:
§ 5 Preemption
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
this Chapter.
Id. § 1334(b).
m Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2614.
"' Rose Cipollone began smoking in 1942. Id. at 2613.
"= Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (D.N.J. 1984).
... Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986). The court also held that
petitioner's claim regarding the advertising and promotion of cigarettes was preempted. rd. at 187.
Id. at 185-87.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 669 (D.N.L 1986).
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988).
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990).
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
"' Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2615 (1992).
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B. Holdings in Cipollone
The Court first acknowledged "that the historic police powers of
the States [are] not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'2 This intent can,
of course, be "'explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose."' 29 While the Third Circuit
engaged in an implied preemption analysis of the acts in question,'30
the Supreme Court opted for an express preemption analysis.' The
Court explained its rationale as follows:
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has
included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing
that issue, and when that provision provides a "reliable indicium of
congressional intent with respect to state authority," "there is
no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the
substantive provisions" of the legislation. [T]he other provisions
of the 1965 and 1969 Acts offer no cause to look beyond § 5 of
each Act. Therefore, we need only identify the domain expressly
pre-empted by each of those sections.'
Therefore, when Congress includes an express preemption provision
in a federal statute, the express language of that statute controls and
courts should not engage in implied preemption analysis at all.
33
" Id. at 2617 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). As a result,
an express preemption provision must be construed "in light of the presumption against the pre-
emption of state police power regulations." Id. at 2618. Further, this "presumption against
preemption" requires a narrow reading of express preemption provisions. Id.
" Id. at 2617 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)); see also Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983)
(discussing preemption due to conflict between state and federal law); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'nv. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-54 (1982) (discussing preemption due to occupation of the
field).
" Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186-87.
", "In our opinion, the pre-emptive scope of the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act is governed entirely
by the express language in § 5 of each Act." Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (emphasis added).
. Id. (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978); California Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987) (Marshall, J.)).
.. In his dissent, Justice Scalia explained the Court's ruling further in observing that "[o]nce there
is an express pre-emption provision, all doctrines of implied pre-emption are elirmnated."
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2633 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The Court first examined the 1965 provision'" and found that it did
not expressly preempt any of the petitioner's state tort law damage
claims. 3' Because "Congress spoke precisely and narrowly" in the
Act,'36 the provision "merely prohibited state and federal rule-making
bodies from mandating partcular cautionary statements on cigarette
labels (§ 5(a)) or in cigarette advertisements (§ 5(b))."'37 The Court
stated that this was the "appropriate" conclusion for several reasons: "the
presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations,"
the fact that the requirement of a specifically-worded warning label does
not automatically preempt an entire field, and the fact that there is no
"inherent conflict between federal pre-emption of state warning require-
ments and the continued vitality of state common law damages ac-
tions."'" The Court further stated that this holding was in line with the
purposes and "regulatory context of the 1965 Act."'39
The Court reached a different conclusion regarding the 1969 Act.4"
In finding that the 1969 provision may have preempted certain state tort
law damage claims, 4' the Court looked principally to changes in the
language of the 1969 provision.14 To the Court, these changes indicated
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1965), amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1969); see also supra note 116 (reproducing the statute in part).
"' Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619.
Id. at 2618.
Id. (emphasis added). Section 4 of the 1965 Act set forth the exact wording to be included on
the labels of cigarette packs. Because the 1965 Act prohibited only any additional required
statements, the Court construed this language to mean that states were merely prohibited from
requiring additional "specifically-worded" statements of the same general type as in section 4 of the
Act. In other words, a state could require additional labeling as long as it was not a statement
different from that required by the Act. "[Section 5] is best read as having superseded only positive
enactments by legislatures or administrative agencies that mandate particular warning labels." Id. at
2618-19 (emphasis added). A state common law damages action would not require any "particular
cautionary statement" to be included on the label, and the Act, therefore, does not preempt these
claims.
.. Id. at 2618. It is interesting to note that in reaching these conclusions, the Court relied in part
on the legislative history of the 1965 Act. Because a review of the legislative history of an Act is
indicative of an implied preemption analysis, this seems to directly conflict with the Court's earlier
determination that the explicit language of an express preemption provision alone should control the
deterrmnation of the scope of that provision. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
... Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619. Notice again that the Court seems to be contradicting itself by
going beyond the explicit language of the statute and into the legislative history.
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Act] (amending the Federal Cigarette and
Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1965)); see also supra note 117 (reproducing the statute in
part).
"' Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621. In determmng whether or not all claims were preempted, the
Court stated: "[W]e must look to each of petitioner's common law claims to determine whether it is
in fact pre-empted." Id., see also infra notes 152, 161-62 and accompanying text.
"' "Compared to its predecessor in the 1965 Act, the plain language of the pre-emption provision
in the 1969 Act is much broader." Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619.
1992-93] FIFRA PREEMPTION 767
Congress' intent to broaden the scope of the preemption provision in the
1969 Act. 43
First, the Court noted that Congress added the phrase "requirement or
prohibition" to the statute,'" broadening the 1965 provision's ban on
"statements."'45 Secondly, Congress extended the previous ban on state-
ments "in advertising"'" to cover any communications "with respect
to the advertising or promotion!' of cigarettes. 7 Despite the fact that both
parties insisted that the 1969 provision did not change the preemptive scope
of the 1965 provision, the Court found this reading to be "incompatible with
the language and origins of the amendments"'" and that the language
clearly evidenced an intent to broaden the reach of the statute.'49 Finally, the
1969 provision added the phrase "imposed under State law," indicating that
none of the aforementioned requirements or prohibitions could be construed
in this manner."s°
However, the fact that the scope of the 1969 provision is not limited to
positive enactments by a state legislature does not mean that all common law
claims are necessarily preempted by the provisions.' Rather, the Court
implemented a "claim-by-claim" analysis, ultimately finding that some clamis
were preempted while others were not.
C. General Principles in Cipollone
Beyond these "bare bones" holdings by the Court,'53 there are several
general principles in Cipollone. First and foremost is the Court's finding that
' The Court stated: "In the context of such revisions and in light of the substantial. changes in
wording, we cannot accept the parties' claim that the 1969 Act did not alter the [preemptive] reach of
§ 5(b):' Id. at 2619-20.
'" Id. at 2619 (discussing the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
40, 1334(b) (amending the Federal Cigarette and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1965)); see
also supra note 117 (reproducing the statute in part).
"I Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619 (discussing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39, 1334(a), (b) (1965), amended
by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40, 1334 (b) (1969)); see also
supra note 116 (reproducing the statute in part).
' Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1965)); see also supra note
116 (reproducing the statute in part).
" Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1969)); see also supra note
117 (reproducing the statute in part).
' Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619. "[The parties'] primary support for this contention [was] a
sentence in a Committee Report which state[d] that the 1969 Act 'clarified' the 1965 version of §
5(b)." Id. (citing S. RE'. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1969), reprinted n 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2652, 2663).
I49 d. at 2619-20.
"' Id. at 2620.
" Id. at 2621.
15 See id. at 2621-25.
The Court held that the 1965 Act did not preempt any of the petitioner's state tort law damage
claims and that the 1969 Act expressly did so as to certain of the petitioner's claims, but not all claims.
Part VI of the Court's opinmon outlines the Court's holding as to each specific claim. See id. at 2625.
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the phrase "requirement or prohibition" in the 1969 provision encom-
passed both positive enactments by state legislatures and common law
damages actions in state courts.1m The petitioner in Cipollone tried
to argue that state common law damage actions do not impose any
sort of "requirements or prohibitions" on defendants. The Court
rejected this reasoning, stating that this analysis was
at odds both with the plain words of the 1969 Act and with the
general understanding of common law damages actions. The phrase
"[n]o requirement or prohibition" sweeps broadly and suggests no
distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the
contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the
form of common law rules. 55
The Court then reemphasized an earlier holding that a state common
law damages award can be just as effective in exerting regulatory
power as a positive enactment by the legislation of a state. 56 In
other words, a state tort law damage action may in some circumstanc-
es be considered the functional equivalent of a direct state regulation
in the form of legislation.
Further, because certain common law damages actions are
"premised on the existence of a legal duty[,] it is difficult to say
that such actions do not impose 'requirements or prohibitions." 5 7
Therefore, the Court concluded that the preemptive scope of the 1969
Act was not limited to positive enactments by the legislature.'"8
Likewise, the Court found that the phrase "State law" in the 1969
provision included common law as well as direct regulation by the
states in the form of a statute or other regulation.' 59 This was true
despite the above maxim that express preemption provisions would be
construed narrowly in light of the presumption against preemption.160
'- Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2620.
15Id.
Id. (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959), wherein the
Court stated that "[t]he obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent
method of governing conduct and controlling policy3).
.. Id. (citations omitted).
1' Id.
Id. See generally Erie R.RL v. Tomplans, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938) (holding that the phrase
"laws of the several states" encompasses state common law as well as state statutory law).




Given this discussion, the Court then announced the test to be applied
to each of the petitioner's common law clauns m order to determine on
an individual basis which were expressly preempted by the 1969
provision and which survived.
The central mquiry in each case is strightforward. we ask whether the
legal duty that is the predicate of the common law damages action
constitutes a "requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
umposed under State law with respect to advertising or
promotion," giving that clause a fair but narrow reading.'
In applying this test to the petitioner's failure-to-warn claim, the Court
held that "insofar as claims under either failure-to-warn theory require a
showing that respondents' post-1969 advertising or promotions should
have included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings, those claims
are pre-empted."'"2
III. THE APPLICATION OF CIPOLLONE TO THE FIFRA
PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
Lower courts now face the task of applying the Supreme Court's
analysis in Cipollone to the question of preemption under FIFRA. While
it may not be completely clear how the analysis is to be applied, it is
clear that there is no longer any question, as there has been in the past,
as to whether the analysis should be applied.' The same preemption
and damages analysis of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act'" applies to the issue of preemption under FIFRA. This is evi-
denced by the fact that the Supreme Court has recently remanded two
FIFRA cases to be reconsidered m light of its decision in Cipollone.'
.' Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621 (quoting the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15
U.S.C. § 1334(5)(b) (1969)).
,, Id. at 2621-22.
" See, eg., Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 628 n.13 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that
FIFRA cases were not applicable to cigarette labeling cases).
1- 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1965), amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1969).
"' Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992), vacating and
remanding Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158 (10th
Cir.), affd sub noma. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d
1992-93]
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The fact that one statute-the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act-requires a specific label'" and the other-FIFRA-simply requires
government approval of a label presented by the manufacturer"6 no
longer distinguishes the application of cigarette labeling cases from those
under FIFRA.'"
A. Express Preemption Analysis
Applying the analysis in Cipollone to FIFRA preemption cases, it
appears that FIFRA expressly preempts state tort law damage clams
based on failure to warn due to inadequate labeling. Because FIFRA
contains an explicit provision regarding the authority granted to
states," 9 courts must look at the express language contained therein and
determine only the scope of federal preemption.7 ' Courts should no
longer engage in an implied preemption analysis of FIFRA after
Cipollone.7' In its analysis of the 1965 and 1969 cigarette labeling
provisions, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it focused solely on
the provisions in question, not on the purpose as stated in the legislative
history.'"2 Because FIFRA contains a similar provision, labeled "Author-
ity of States,' ' 3  courts must focus on the express language of that
section and determine only which state tort law damage claims must fail
and which may survive. According to the Supreme Court's statement that
it relied on the statutory language alone, it would appear to be improper
to focus on the purposes of FIFRA as stated in its legislative history m
1177 (10th Cir. 1993); Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), vacating and remanding
Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (1lth Cir. 1991).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40, 1333(a) (1969).
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y, 136a(c)(1)(C) (1988 & Supp. 111990).
165 See Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 805.-06 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Fitzgerald v.
Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404, 406-07 (E.D. Mich. 1987). Contra Palmer v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 623 n.5, 628 n.13 (lst Cir. 1987); Stewart v. Ortho Consumer Prods., No.
CIV.A.4252, 1990 WL 36129 (E.D. La. Mar. 26, 1990); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp.
85, 86-87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 198 (N.D. 11. 1988).
-- 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1988).
'" See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2618 (1992); see also Burke v. Dow
Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (utilizing an express preemption analysis); Kennan
v. Dow Chen. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 804-05 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (utilizing an express preemption
analysis); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404, 406-07 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (focusing on
express language of§ 136v(b)). But see Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2482
(1991) (engaging in an implied preemption analysis regarding pesticide use regulation).
1' Contra Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. App. 1992) (undertaking an
implied preemption analysis); Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 934-36 (Nev. 1992)
(holding that Congress occupied the field of pesticide labeling under FIFRA).
17 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618. But see supra note 138.
" 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1988).
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determining preemption, even though the Supreme Court's consideration
of the federal statute's purpose m Cipollone sends mixed signals to lower
courts. 74 In the end, however, the inclusion of the express preemption
provision m FIFRA is an "indicium" that Congress intended to preempt
the area m question, namely pesticide labeling. 7
In reconciling the language of sections 136v(a) and (b) of FIFRA,
courts must distinguish between state preemption of sale or use and state
preemption of labeling,'76 based on the holding m Cipollone that the
express language of a preemption provision controls the scope of federal
preemption.'" In section 136v(a), Congress mandated that "[a] State
may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide in
the State, " except that the states may not go beyond FIFRA and
allow a use expressly prohibited theretn. Immediately following,
'" See supra notes 138-39. However, even if the legislative history is considered in the FIFRA
preemption analysis, it seems clear that Congress intended to allow the states authority to regulate
the sale or use of pesticides, but not the labeling of pesticides, as one of the stated purposes of
PIFRA is "uniformity." See supra note 90.
See also Arkansas-Platte I, 959 F.2d 158, 162 (10th Cir.) (finding that part of the "full purpose
of § 136v(b) is to ensure uniform labeling standards.'), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chew. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992), affid sub non
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnersip v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993);
Cheucal Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941, 944 (9th Cir.) ("Congress included the
preemption provision in FIFRA to promote uniformity '), cert dented, 113 S. Ct. 80 (1992);
Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1025 (1lth Cir. 1991) ("One of the EPA's objectives in its
labeling regulations is the uniformity of labeling "), vacated and remanded sub nom. Papas v.
Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct 3020 (1992), a ff'dsub no. Papas v. Upjohn Co., No. 89-3752, 1993 WL
41169 (1lth Cir. Mar. 8, 1993); Riden v. ICI Ams., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1508 (W.D. Mo. 1991)
(noting that there is a "uniform system of labeling fostered under FIFRA."); Davidson v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 937 (Nev. 1992) ("[Sltate damage actions would hinder Congress' goal
of reaching uniformity of pesticide labeling:) (citation omitted).
,' See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
'n Discussing this distinction, the court in Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Allenby stated the
following:
So long as additional labeling is not required, FIFRA expressly authorizes state pesticide
regulation. Other than regulating labels, states are left free to impose whatever restrictions
they may wish. Consequently, a state could prohibit the sale of a pesticide within its
borders even though it could not require the manufacturer of the pesticide to change the
label. Congress included the preemption provision in FIFRA to.promote uniformity
and ease distribution practices for chemical product manufacturers. [T]he importance
of a uniform labeling system under FIFRA is rooted in a concern for clarity so that
consumers can easily recognize warning labels no matter which state they enter.
Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, 958 F.2d at 944-45 (emphasis added); see also New York State
Pesticide Coalition v. Jorling, 874 F.2d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1989) ('qhe states have joint control with
the federal government in regulating the use of pesticides, with the exception of the EPA's
exclusve supervision of labeling.") (citation omitted).
"n Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 ("[Ihe pre-emptive scope of the [Acts] is governed entirely
by the express language in each Act.").
7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (1988).
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however, is section 136v(b), which provides that "[s]uch State shall not
impose any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or
different from those required under [FIFRA]."'' T The Supreme Court
addressed this "use/labeling" distinction indirectly in Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier,5 ° and held that automatic preemption of pesticide
labeling of any type would be inconsistent with the Court's decision in
that case.' To find that labeling regulations are not preempted would
render the language in section 136v(b) superfluous and unnecessary "
Most pre-Cipollone FIFRA cases passed over the question of express
preemption, relying instead on an implied preemption analysis.'
Therefore, Cipollone encourages courts to undertake an evaluation of the
express preemptive value of FIFRA.' By focusing their attention on
"' Id. § 136v(b).
III S.Ct. 2476 (1991); see supra notes 95-110 and accompanying text (discussing the Moflier
decision).
.. See also Yowell . Chevron Chemical Co., which states:
While the holding of Mortier is confined to the regulation of pesticides by local
governments, we are nevertheless inclined to adopt its construction of FIFRA. mhe
court said: "A plain reading of the statute indicates an intent to maintain the traditional
police powers of the states in the general grant of authority to 'regulate the sale or use' of
pesticides, § 136v(a), and a more specific intent to occupy the field in labeling and
packaging, § 136v(b)."
That construction of § 136v(b) is supported by the fact that Congress, in 1988,
amended that provision to insert the caption "Uniformity."
Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Arkansas-Platte &
Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 160, 163 (10th Cir.), vacated and
remanded sub nor. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992),
afd sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177
(10th Cir. 1993)).
Mortier, li S. Ct. at 2486; Arkansas-Platte I, 959 F.2d 158, 163 (10th Cir.), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992),
af'dsub noma. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177
(10th Cir. 1993).
'" See Arkansas-Platte 1, 959 F.2d at 161; Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1024 (1lth Cir.
1991), vacated and remanded sub noam. Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), a ffidsub
nom. Papas v. Upjohn Co., No. 89-3752, 1993 WL 41169 (1lth Cir. Mar. 8, 1993); Ferebee v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Stewart
v. Ortho Consumer Prods., No. CIV.A.87.4252, 1990 WL 36129, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 26, 1990);
Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Mo. 1990); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716 F.
Supp. 1283, 1286-87 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa.
1989); Roberts v. Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 197 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Wilson v. Chevron Chem.
Co., 1986 WL 14925 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986). But see Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp.
1128, 1139-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Kennan v. Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 804-05 (M.D. Fla.
1989).
"4 Cipollone does not disturb the analysis undertaken in Burke v. Dow Chemical Co. (a post-
Cipollone case finding express jpreemption); Kennan v. Dow Chemical Co. (a pre-Cipollone case
finding express preemption); or Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
(a pre-Cipollone case finding preemption, but not indicating whether it is express or implied
preemption).
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the express language of section 136v(b) and not automatically
dismissing the possibility of express preemption, lower courts may be
more apt to find implied preemption analysis unnecessary after
Cipollone.'85
B. Common Law Damage Claims Versus Legislative Action
In Cipollone, the Supreme Court indicated that in the case of the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, a state tort law
damage action based on failure to warn would have the same effect
as a state regulation or legislative action." 6 Whereas the FIFRA
provisions in question seem to fall somewhere in between the 1965
" Two of the FIFRA preemption cases decided by lower courts since Cipollone have relied on
an implied preemption analysis. See Yowell v. Chevron Chem. Co., 836 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. App. 1992);
Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931, 933-34 (Nev. 1992). However, four federal district
courts have held that FIFRA expressly preempts state tort law damage clams based on failure to
warn and inadequate labeling. See Levesque v. Miles, Inc., No. CIV.92-94-JD, 1993 WL 82124
(D.N.H. March 18, 1993); Casper v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 903, 907 (E.D.
Wash. 1992); Gibson v. Dow Cherm. Co., No. CIV.A.92.30, 1992 WL 404681 at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct.
19, 1992); Burke v. Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1140 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Further, a federal
district court in Montana found no preemption at all. Couture v. Dow Chem. U.S.A., 804 F. Supp.
1298 (D. Mont. 1992). A federal distnct court in Maine stated that "Cipollone mandates that the
Plaintiffs' state tort actions are preempted under FIFRA as a matter of law." King v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 806 F. Supp. 903 (D. Me. 1992). The different analyses undertaken and
conclusions drawn in these cases underscore the necessity of a clear mandate on the issue of
FIFRA's preemptive value by either the Supreme Court or Congress.
The only court of appeals to decide this issue post-Cipollone is the Tenth Circuit in Arkansas-
Platte 1, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993). The court reaffirmed its decision in Arkansas-Platte I, this
time relying on an express preemption analysis. Comparing FIFRA with the 1969 Act in Cipollone,
the court stated:
Although the words employed in [§] 136v(b) of FIFRA are different from those in [§] 5(b)
of the Cigarette Smoking Act, their effect is the same. Section 136v(b) exists in the
context of what federal law permits the state to regulate, and it simply deprives the state
of power to adopt any regulation. This is as broad as the [§] 5(b) proscription.
Moreover, when Congress [included § 136v(b)], it gave a "reliable indicium of
congressional intent with respect to state authority." We believe Congress circumscribed
the area of labeling and packaging and preserved it only for federal law. With the same
stroke, Congress banned any form of state regulation, and the interdiction law is clear
and irrefutable
Id. at 1179 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2608, 2618 (.1992)).
Even more indicative of the need for clear direction in this area is the fact that a court recently
adopted the Ferebee reasoning in holding FIFRA did not preempt state tort law damage claims.
MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., No. CIV.A.1:91CV162, 1993 WL 49898, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25,
1993). But see Levesque v. Miles, Inc., No. CIV.92-94-JD, 1993 WL 82124 (D.N.H. March 18, 1993)
(finding express preemption).
'U See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
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and 1969 provisions analyzed in Cipollone,'87 it is not immediately
clear whether Congress intended to allow state tort law damage claims
based on inadequate pesticide labeling. However, closer examination
including a comparison of the provisions of each federal statute
support the conclusion that Congress did not intend to allow such
claims.
One similarity between the preemption provisions is obvious: both
statutes prohibit additional "requirements" from being nposed by the
states. ' In Cipollone, the Court found that the 1969 provision's ban on
"requirements or prohibitions" implied that Congress intended a much
more broad preemption than was established by the 1965 version of the
Act.89 However, a reference to "prohibitions" is noticeably absent from
the FIFRA preemption provision. It is possible to conclude that this
omission indicates Congress' intent to preempt only positive enactments
by state legislatures, but this conclusion ignores the Court's discussion of
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmnon'9 in Cipollone."' It
also overlooks part of FIFRA's legislative history, which at one point
refers to section 136v(b) as a "prohibition."' 92
Another difference between the statutes is that the provision at issue
in Cipollone bars any requirements or prohibitions "imposed under State
law," 93 while the provision m FIFRA merely prohibits a "State" from
imposmg any additional requirements."' The Court in Cipollone
concluded that "State law" necessarily includes both statutory law and
common law, rejecting any attempt to limit the preemption to positive
enactments by state legislatures.'95 There is no mention of the word
"law" in the FIFRA provision, which the Supreme Court somewhat relies
upon m Cipollone."' However, the word "law" may be necessarily
implied, for how else is a state to impose requirements but through
"laws," be they positive enactments or the common law'0
7
r See supra notes 111-52 and accompanying text.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1969) ("No requirement or prohibition shall be imposed
") with 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988) ("Such State shall not impose any requirement for
labeling or packaging ").
.. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619; see supra notes 14045 and accompanying text.
359 U.S. 236 (1959).
112 S. Ct. at 2620; see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 1II S. Ct. 2476, 2484 n.4 (1991).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1969).
'9 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).
See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2620-21.
"'Id. at 2620; see supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
... This point is clearly open to interpretation by lower courts, but should not prove to be a
stumbling block in the express preemption analysis.
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More inportantly, the Cipollone Court emphasized that the general
understanding of common law rules is such that there is no distinction
between positive enactments and common law when Congress uses the
language "requirements or prohibitions."'98 Regulation can be exerted
by the states through an award of damages just as effectively as through
direct regulation by legislatures and, therefore, there should be no
distinction between the two. ' The Cipollone Court seems to have
implicitly rejected the "choice of reaction" theory" advanced m
Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,"0' which proceeds on the premise
that a damage award will not necessarily have a regulatory effect on
manufacturers. Justice Blackmun cited Ferebee in support of Is rationale
denouncing preemption, bringing this theory to the Court's attention.2 2
Significantly, six members of the Supreme Court declined to subscribe to
Blackmnun's analysis,"3 which further indicates that the Court would not
accept the "choice of reaction" theory offered m Ferebee.
C. Applying the Cipollone Test
Cipollone does not offer a "bright line" rule for determining whether a
particular federal statute preempts all state common law actions. Rather, the
Court advocates a "claim-by-claim" evaluation, applying the same test to
Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2620.
1"Id.; see also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ("Even
the States' salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for past harm cannot be
exerted to regulate activities that are potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory scheme.").
But see Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339, 1345 (D. Mont.
1991); Riden v. I.C.I. Ares., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
In Arkansas-Platte H, the Tenth Circuit focused on this conclusion. Regarding the effect of an
award of damages, the court stated the following:
When one looks to the purpose underlying both legislative regulation of labeling and
packaging and a state common law duty to warn, it becomes evident those purposes are
the same. Indeed, a state common law duty to warn is nothing more than a duty to label
a product to provide information. In that sense, the common law duty is no less a
"requirement" m the preemption scheme than a state statute imposing the same burden.
The objectives of the common law duty and a regulatory statute are the same Both
address a manufacturer's duty to convey information about aproduct through the medium
of a label. Therefore, we believe it only logical to hold that the common law duty to
warn is subjected to the same federal preemptive constraints as a state statute.
Arkansas-Platte II, 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The
court concluded that "[t]o the extent that state tort claims require a showing that defendants'
labeling and packaging should have included additional, different or alternatively stated warnings
from those required under FIFRA, they would be expressly preempted." Id.
'"See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
736 F.2d 1529, 1540 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
"'Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2628 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"'Id. Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter in Is opinion.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
each. This test, adapted to reflect the language at issue in FIFRA preemption
cases, is as follows:
The central inquiy in each case is straightforward we ask whether the legal
duty that is the predicate of the common law damages action constitutes
["any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from
those required under" FIFRA], giving that clause a fair but narrow
reading.
The results of the application of this test to the facts m Cipollone and to the
facts present in a FIFRA failure-to-warn case appear to be identical. In
Cipollone, the Court found that the petitioner's failure-to-warn claim
required a showing that respondents' advertising (or other promotional
materials) should have included additional or more clearly stated
warnings." 5 Similarly, a FIFRA failure-to-warn claim based on made-
quate labeling requires a showing that the manufacturer should have
included additional or more clearly stated warnings on the label of its
pesticides." 6
The basic premise of the failure-to-warn claim is that the manufactur-
er should have included additional warnings. To the extent that state tort
law damage claims are based on such omissions, they appear to be
preempted by FIFRA, which unequivocally prohibits a state from
requiring additional warnings on labels approved thereunder.2 7 There-
fore, application of the Cipollone inquiry requires courts to find that
FIFRA prevents plaintiffs from bringing state tort law damage claims
based on failure to warn and inadequate labeling."8
' Id. at 2621 (inserting language from the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,
7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988)).
Id. at 2621-22.
'' One court described the showing required as follows:
Negligent failure to warn requires a showing that a manufacturer did not warn of a
particular risk for reasons which fell below the acceptable standard of care, that is, what
a reasonable manufacturer would have known and would have warned about. Strict
liability requires only a showing that the manufacturer did not adequately warn of a nsk
known or knowable in light of the available information at the time of manufacture and
distribution. Under either theory, the adequacy of the warning is a key determnnation. A
warning is inadequate when it is not given in a manner likely to reach those to whom
harm is reasonably foreseeable.
Ramnirez v. Plough, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 427 (App. 1992) (citations omitted) (discussing a
failure-to-warn claim in connection with aspirin bottle warnings requested by the Food and Drug
Adminmstration).
7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).
See Arkansas-Platte II, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993) for a post-Cipollone analysis of these




The Supreme Court addressed the issue of federal preemption
generally in Cipollone, but gave lower courts little direction in how to
apply the analysis to federal statutes other than the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act. In what seems to be becoming an all too familiar
trend with the Court, a concurring majority held in often conflicting
opinions that failure-to-warn claims based on inadequate labeling were
expressly preempted by the preemption provision of the 1969 Act. It is
disturbing, however, that the Supreme Court set aside any and all policy
considerations in reaching this conclusion. For example, is it wise to
ignore issues such as the compensatory aims of state tort law when
Congress has not spoken in the clearest of terms?
The federal courts of appeals are currently split on the issue of
whether section 136v(b) of FIFRA preempts state tort law damage claims
based on the inadequate labeling of pesticides;. 9 the Supreme Court's
remand of Arkansas-Platte 121 and the Tenth Circuit's reconsideration
of the case2" have not mended this split, as several federal district
courts have chosen not to apply the same analysis as that applied in
Arkansas-Platte I. Applying Cipollone to the FIFRA preemption
analysis results in the conclusion that Congress has expressly preempted
all state tort law damage claims based on failure to warn. This is based
on the explicit language of section 136v(b) of FIFRA and the Supreme
Court's emphasis in Cipollone on the regulatory effect of state tort law
damages actions."' However, it is not entirely clear that courts will
extend Cipollone in this manner, as evidenced by the fact that post-
Cipollone decisions in lower courts have not engaged in identical analyses
of the issue.2"4 Clearly, the Supreme Court or Congress will have to
speak directly to this issue if the lower courts cannot come to some
' See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text; supra notes 45-75 and accompanying text
(discussing Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dented, 469 U.S. 1062
(1984), which holds state tort law damage claims are not preempted by FIFRA); supra notes 76-94
and accompanying text (discussing Arkansas-Platte H, 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnerslp v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992),
affd sub nom. Arkansas.Platte Gulf & Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177
(10th Cir. 1993), which holds state tort law damage claims are preempted by FIFRA); supra notes
185, 199 (discussing Arkansas-Platte H, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chem. Co., 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992).
z Arkansas-Platte II, 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993); see supra notes 185, 199 for a discussion
of the Tenth Circuit's subsequent decision to reaffirm.
m See supra note 185.
a" See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
i1 See supra note 185.
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consensus on their own, lest the state of FIFRA preemption law continue
to be inconsistently applied. Given the trend that is being established,
however, such a consensus seems unlikely.
Caroline E. Boeh
